

# Antisemitic Attitudes Across the Ideological Spectrum\*

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## Abstract

Concern about antisemitism in the U.S. has grown following recent rises in deadly assaults, vandalism, and harassment. Public accounts of antisemitism have focused on both the ideological right and left. However, there is little quantitative research evaluating left-wing versus right-wing antisemitism. Building on theories of social identity, racial competition, and affective partisanship, we examine antisemitic attitudes across the ideological spectrum and across demographic cohorts. We conduct several experiments on an original survey of 3,500 U.S. adults, including a large oversample of adults ages 18-30. We find evidence of prejudice on the ideological left and among racial minority groups, but the data clearly show the epicenter of antisemitic attitudes is young adults on the far right. Unlike social identities that are closely aligned with ideology and partisanship, Jewish identity remains an outgroup to Americans across typical political divides, resulting in diverse forms of prejudice.

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# 1 INTRODUCTION

Antisemitism has become a growing concern in the United States. Antisemitic hate crimes are frequent (Feinberg 2020).<sup>1</sup> Perceived concerns about the seriousness of antisemitism are high (Smith and Schapiro 2019). According to a 2020 poll, 62% of Americans — and 88% of Jewish Americans — consider antisemitism a problem. Over 80% of Jewish identifiers agreed in 2020 that antisemitism had increased over the previous five years.<sup>2</sup>

Recent public-facing accounts focus on both the political right and the political left as hotspots for modern antisemitism (Weiss 2019; Lipstadt 2019). Violent right-wing antisemitism in the U.S. has driven incidents like synagogue shootings in 2018 and 2019.<sup>3</sup> White nationalists were seen in Charlottesville in 2017 chanting “Jews will not replace us,” and in the 2021 siege on the Capitol they were seen with pro-Holocaust paraphernalia.<sup>4</sup> Violent right-wing antisemitism has also been resurgent in Europe.<sup>5</sup> Non-violent right-wing antisemitism also arises frequently. There is substantial evidence of right-wing antisemitic harassment of journalists,<sup>6</sup> and on multiple occasions, Donald Trump has engaged in antisemitic stereotypes about Jewish disloyalty and Jewish economic power.<sup>7</sup>

Violent antisemitic attacks have not exclusively come from right-wing white nationalists. Recent attacks in the New York area have come primarily from African Americans.<sup>8</sup> Some of the recent violence, including deadly attacks at a kosher supermarket and at a chanukah

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<sup>1</sup>See also: Adeel Hassan, “‘A Different Era’: Anti-Semitic Crimes, and Efforts to Track Them, Climb,” *New York Times*, Jan 3, 2020.; Criminal Justice Information Services Division, “2018 Hate Crime Statistics,” Table 4, Offense Type by Bias Motivation, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2020.

<sup>2</sup>Avi Mayer, “The State of Antisemitism in America 2020,” *American Jewish Committee* 2020.

<sup>3</sup>Zach Beauchamp, “Poway and Pittsburgh: The Rise in Murderous anti-Semitism, Explained,” *Vox*, May 1, 2019.

<sup>4</sup>Emma Green, “Why the Charlottesville Marchers Were Obsessed with Jews,” *Atlantic*, August 15, 2017; “Rioters Used Anti-Semitic Imagery During Capitol Assault,” *CBS News*, Jan. 15, 2021.

<sup>5</sup>“German Jews Warned Not To Wear Kippas After Rise in Anti-Semitism,” *BBC News*, May 26, 2019.

<sup>6</sup>Emma Green, “The Tide of Hate Directed Against Jewish Journalists,” *Atlantic*, October 19, 2016.

<sup>7</sup>Bess Levin, “Trump Goes Full Anti-Semite in Room Full of Jewish People,” *Vanity Fair*, Dec 9, 2019.

<sup>8</sup>Liam Stack, “Most Visible Jews’ Fear Being Targets as Anti-Semitism Rises,” *New York Times*, Feb. 17, 2020.

party, were seemingly spurred by conspiracy theories originating from Nation of Islam leader Louis Farrakhan.<sup>9</sup>

Recent accounts of left-wing antisemitism focus more on non-violent conflicts — particularly on extreme negative views towards Israel, which have even been theorized to be socially acceptable guises for antisemitic attitudes on the left (Marcus 2007; Cohen et al. 2011, 2009). Democratic President Joe Biden, when he was his party’s nominee for President in 2020, claimed, “Criticism of Israel’s policy is not anti-Semitism, but too often that criticism from the left morphs into anti-Semitism.”<sup>10</sup> In England, reports of antisemitism primarily surrounding views on Israel have caused division, resignations, and scandal within the Labour Party under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn (Lipstadt 2019). College students and anti-Israel activism on campuses have been the focus of several accounts of left-wing antisemitism as well; the legal scholar Kenneth Marcus described the atmosphere on college campuses as a “perfect storm” for antisemitism (Marcus 2007). Donald Trump issued an executive order in 2019 to combat antisemitism and drew particular attention to antisemitism on college campuses, presumably driven by students and faculty on the left.<sup>11</sup>

Despite anecdotal evidence and theorizing about why antisemitism may be growing on both the political left and the political right, there is little quantitative evidence on the relationship between ideology and antisemitic attitudes. In this article, we report on a major new study we conducted on antisemitic attitudes in the United States, evaluating key hypotheses of antisemitism on the ideological left and the ideological right. In the fall of 2020, we conducted an original survey of U.S. adults, including a representative sample of 2,500 adults ages 18-30 and a comparison sample of 1,000 adults 18 and older, allowing us

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<sup>9</sup>Jane Coaston, “The Conspiracy Theories Behind the Anti-Semitic Violence in New York,” *Vox*, Jan 3, 2020.

<sup>10</sup>Shane Goldmacher, “Biden Calls Out ‘Anti-Semitism’ on the Left and Criticizes Israeli Policy,” *New York Times*, May 19, 2020.

<sup>11</sup>Laurel Wamsley, “Trump Signs Order Against Anti-Semitism at Colleges, Worrying Free Speech Advocates,” *NPR*, Dec 11, 2019.

to evaluate the prevalence of different manifestations of antisemitic beliefs across ideological positions and across demographic cohorts. We examine both overt antisemitic attitudes as well as more subtle antisemitic attitudes.

The survey focuses on young adults (with a comparison to a full adult nationally-representative sample) because on both the left and the right, we expected young adults to have distinctly negative views related to Jewish Americans. Many of the allegations of left-wing antisemitism have focused on young people and college students for whom anti-Israel attitudes are suspected of leading to antisemitic attitudes. Likewise, many of the allegations of right-wing antisemitism focus on the alt-right, an identity associated with young white men.<sup>12</sup>

We designed this study with particular sensitivity to the public conversations about the relationship between anti-Israel activities and antisemitism.<sup>13</sup> While we find evidence consistent with theories of both left-wing and right-wing antisemitism, the results convey an unambiguous message that antisemitic attitudes are far more prevalent on the right. In addition, our evidence suggests significantly higher rates of antisemitic attitudes among racial minorities relative to whites across the ideological spectrum.

Drawing on the literature on social identity theory, racial competition, and affective partisanship, we theorize how out-group prejudices may manifest against Jews across ideological and demographic cohorts. Along with providing a new understanding of antisemitism and its relative force on the political left and the political right, this study offers a significant contribution to political science literature through new discoveries of an out-group prejudice that cuts across typical ideological and partisan divisions.

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<sup>12</sup>Angela Nagle, “The Lost Boys,” *Atlantic*, December 2017; “Alt Right: A Primer on the New White Supremacy,” Anti-Defamation League, 2020.

<sup>13</sup>E.g. Weiss (2019); Peter Beinart, “Debunking the Myth that Anti-Zionism is Antisemitic,” *The Guardian*, March 7, 2019.

## 2 ANTISEMITISM IN THREE REALMS

While violent hate crimes against Jews are often easy to categorize as antisemitic, attitudes and opinions are more difficult to evaluate. Definitions of antisemitism are highly contested. Consider a statement defining antisemitism that was developed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) and adopted by the U.S. Department of State during the Obama Administration: antisemitism includes, among other things, “holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel;” “accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel, or to the alleged priorities of Jews worldwide, than to the interests of their own nations,” “applying double standards by requiring of [Israel] a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation;” and “making mendacious, dehumanizing, demonizing, or stereotypical allegations about Jews as such or the power of Jews as collective.”<sup>14</sup>

Some of these categories of antisemitism are associated with the political right (e.g. claims of disloyalty) while others are associated with the political left (e.g. holding Jews collectively responsible for the state of Israel). Critics on the left argue that the IHRA definition leads to inappropriately construing criticisms of Israel as antisemitic.<sup>15</sup> On the other hand, U.S. conservatives, unlike liberals, do not believe that accusing Jews of being more loyal to Israel than America counts as antisemitism.<sup>16</sup>

While acknowledging that defining antisemitism is fraught, we measure antisemitism in ways that would fall under the umbrella of the IHRA definition. We investigate claims of Jewish disloyalty and power and claims that U.S. Jews should be penalized for the actions of Israel. We confirm in our own data that U.S. Jews view these claims as antisemitic.

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<sup>14</sup>Office of the Special Envoy to Monitor and Combat Antisemitism, “Defining Anti-Semitism,” U.S. Department of State, 2016.

<sup>15</sup>Ben Sales, “The IHRA Definition of Anti-Semitism and Why People Are Fighting Over It, Explained,” *Jewish Telegraph Agency*, January 15, 2016.

<sup>16</sup>Kathy Frankovic, “Americans Cannot Agree on What Behaviors are Anti-Semitic,” YouGov Jan 6, 2020.

We also measure antisemitism as it manifests in “double standards” and “litmus tests,” in which U.S. Jews are held accountable for the actions of Israel in ways not expected of other Americans of different faiths or with different religious/cultural homelands. We do not, and need not, take a normative position on whether the particular measures we study are objectively or decisively antisemitic (if such a position could even possibly be taken). Rather, we take the position that the manifestations of antisemitism we study are consistent with how the U.S. government (via the IHRA definition), Jewish organizations (such as the Anti-Defamation League), and Jewish Americans (as investigated here and elsewhere) would identify antisemitism.

In spite of claims in popular discourse about antisemitism on the left (particularly related to anti-Israel attitudes) and the right (particularly related to white nationalism), past survey research has not focused primarily on differences in antisemitic attitudes along a left-right ideological spectrum. In fact, antisemitic attitudes have been found to be as common among Republican identifiers as Democratic ones (Cohen 2018). Prior survey research focuses on demographic groups rather than ideological groups that exhibit high rates of antisemitism. The research has pointed to higher rates of antisemitism among young people, old people, Black and Latino identifiers, and non-college educated Americans, as well as those who live in close proximity to Jewish populations (Smith and Schapiro 2019; Cohen 2018; Feinberg 2020).

Changing attitudes and demographics give us reason to focus on the relationship between antisemitism and ideology, particularly among young American adults. In general, young people – college students in particular – exhibit more tolerant and cosmopolitan attitudes than older people. This might suggest lower levels of antisemitism (Shenhav-Goldberg and Kopstein 2020; Federico and Sidanius 2002). However, unlike other prejudicial attitudes that have been found to be more common in older adults than younger adults (Stewart, von Hippel and Radvansky 2009), several prior studies have shown that antisemitism is more

common among young people. Prior studies have theorized higher antisemitic attitudes in young adults may result from factors such as declining salience of the Holocaust as well as increasingly negative attitudes toward the state of Israel (Cohen 2018; Smith and Schapiro 2019).

On both the political left and the political right, the pathways to antisemitism may be different for young people than for older cohorts. The American left has long had a commitment to supporting the oppressed (Ellis 1996).<sup>17</sup> With the increased activism on college campuses surrounding the Israel/Palestine conflict, Israel and Jews may now be viewed as oppressors by many young adults (Marcus 2007; Lipstadt 2019; Kosmin and Keysar 2015). This may lead young liberals to have a more negative view of Jews compared to older generations. On the other side, the young far-right exhibits reactionary attitudes toward tolerance and political correctness.<sup>18</sup> The growth of the alt-right movement has occurred mostly online and primarily attracted young adults;<sup>19</sup> it may induce antisemitic attitudes in young people who are particularly exposed to it. On account of these factors, we focus this study especially, though not exclusively, on young adults.

With a focus on young adults, we examine antisemitic attitudes emerging from three main spheres of American politics: (1) the ideological left, (2) the ideological right, and (3) racial minority groups, namely Black Americans and Latino Americans. While antisemitism may emerge from these cohorts for different reasons, our understanding of antisemitism across all three stems from social identity theory (Tajfel et al. 1971; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; Huddy, Mason and Aaroe 2015; Mason 2018; Druckman and Levendusky 2019; Klar, Krupnikov and Ryan 2018; Lelkes and Westwood 2017). In all three of these spheres, Jews may be perceived as an out-group. Antisemitism may thus arise in each case as the in-group

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<sup>17</sup>Owen Jones, “On Solidarity,” *Jacobin*, 2017.

<sup>18</sup>Kate Taylor, “Gen Z is More Conservative Than Many Realize — But the Instagram-Fluent Generation Will Revolutionize the Right,” *Business Insider*, 2019; Kat Chow, “‘Politically Correct’: The Phrase Has Gone from Wisdom to Weapon,” *NPR*, Dec. 14, 2016.

<sup>19</sup>Angela Nagle, “The Lost Boys,” *The Atlantic*, Dec. 2017.

focuses on negative aspects of the out-group (Jews) in order to raise their group esteem. We now examine, theoretically, how Jews can be viewed as an outgroup in each sphere and how the out-group status engenders antisemitic attitudes.

## 2.1 Right Wing Antisemitism

Research on right-wing antisemitism focuses on beliefs that Jews are disloyal - both to America and to the white race - and that they are too powerful. American Jews are distinctive in that they are high in socio-economic status and mostly identify as white, but unlike others with those attributes, they are liberal in their social views and supportive of racial equality and immigration (Smith and Schapiro 2019; Smith 2013). In the far-right mentality, Jews are viewed as people pretending to be white – “a faux-white race that has tainted America”<sup>20</sup> – or disloyal white people – “the ultimate betrayers of the white race.”<sup>21</sup> Compared to those in the middle of the ideological spectrum, we expect those on the far right to exhibit more antisemitic attitudes about dual loyalty and Jewish power. Because we expect the far right to believe Jews are loyal to Israel, we also hypothesize that they will hold the view that Jewish Americans are responsible or culpable for the action of the state of Israel.

Antisemitic attitudes on the right may at first seem at odds with the fact that Republican elites have been vocally supportive of the government of Israel, and that Republican identifiers report high levels of affinity toward Israel (Cavari 2012). But it is clearly possible for one to support Israel while also harboring antisemitic views, such as that Jews as a collective seek to dominate institutions of finance, media, or government. Pro-Israel attitudes on the right can even stem from antisemitism: as journalist Peter Beinart has noted, white nationalists may want Israel to thrive precisely so that Jews will leave the United States

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<sup>20</sup>Emma Green, “Are Jews White?” *Atlantic*, Dec 5, 2016.

<sup>21</sup>See Weiss (2019).



and go there.<sup>22</sup> Finally, pro-Israel attitudes may be attributable not to any affinity for Jews but to negative affect toward Muslims, inasmuch as several Muslim nations consider Israel a nemesis.<sup>23</sup> For these reasons, the right's pro-Israel attitudes do not amount to positive affect toward Jews nor would they be expected to necessarily yield positive attitudes toward Jews.

## 2.2 Left Wing Antisemitism

Research on left-wing antisemitism has primarily examined the relationship between Israel/Palestine attitudes and antisemitic attitudes, but not exclusively so. For instance, Lipstadt (2019) theorizes about a broader connection between ideological extremism and antisemitism. Those on the far left (as with those on far right) hold more populist viewpoints and may be more skeptical of power and ruling elites. This skepticism could activate antisemitic views of Jews as elites, leading to an out-group view of Jews. Extremists, in other words, may see Jews as an outgroup because of a perception of Jews as wielding power and upholding unjust capitalistic power structures (Nirenberg 2013).

More research focuses on the left's changing views on Israel. Over the last twenty years in the United States there has been a partisan shift in attitudes toward Israel (Cavari 2012; Cavari and Freedman 2019). The left, and particularly the young left, no longer sympathizes with Israel in the Israel/Palestine conflict.<sup>24</sup> Support for Palestine and criticism of Israel has become commonplace in recent left social movements,<sup>25</sup> and some of the most prominent political leaders of the young left, such as members of the "Squad," have been supportive of the boycott, divestment, and sanctions campaign against Israel.<sup>26</sup> Young liberals likely pick

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<sup>22</sup>Peter Beinart, "Debunking the Myth that Anti-Zionism is Antisemitic," *The Guardian*, March 7, 2019.

<sup>23</sup>See, e.g. George Hawley, "Ambivalent Nativism: Trump Supporters' Attitudes Toward Islam and Muslim Immigration," *Brookings*, July 24, 2019.

<sup>24</sup>Pew Research Center, "Republicans and Democrats Grow Even Farther Apart in Views of Israel, Palestinians," January 2018.

<sup>25</sup>Emily Shire, "Does Feminism Have Room for Zionism?," *The New York Times*, March 7, 2017; Emma Green, "Why Do Black Activists Care About Palestine?," *The Atlantic*, August 18, 2016.

<sup>26</sup>Sheryl Gay Stolberg, "House Overwhelmingly Condemns Movement to Boycott Israel," *The New York Times*, July 23, 2019

up on these anti-Israel signals, leading to them to develop anti-Israel attitudes themselves (Zaller 1992).

Theoretically, negative attitudes toward Israel can be unrelated to antisemitism, can lead to antisemitism, and/or can result from antisemitism. Prior studies exploring the link between antisemitism and opinion on the Israel/Palestine conflict have shown a relationship between the two. In a study of Europeans, Kaplan and Small (2006) asked one battery of questions about Israel/Palestine and a separate battery about Jews. Respondents who held strongly anti-Israel views (e.g., believing that Palestinian suicide bombers against Israeli civilians are justified) were also likely to hold antisemitic beliefs that are completely unrelated to the Israel/Palestine conflict (e.g., believing Jews have too much power in finance). Other studies have found a similar relationship (Beattie 2017; Smith and Schapiro 2019; Cohen et al. 2009; Shenhav-Goldberg and Kopstein 2020).

How might negative attitudes about Israel lead to antisemitic attitudes? To the extent that liberal identifiers seek to identify with the oppressed over the oppressor and believe that Israel is an oppressor, they might hold negative attitudes toward Jews, who they associate with the oppressor. Just as progressives might express dislike toward evangelical Christians if they identify evangelical Christians as a group that holds a set of policy views they deem oppressive (e.g., anti-LGBTQ), progressives might similarly dislike Jews as a group for holding a set of pro-Israel views they deem to be oppressive. This explanation is at the root of criticisms over Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party (Lipstadt 2019).

How might antisemitism instead lead to anti-Israel attitudes? Consider an analogy to research on the relationship between policy views (e.g., about affirmative action) and racism. As Federico and Sidanius (2002) write, white Americans’ opposition to affirmative action “may simply mask desire for group dominance” (see also Tesler (2012)). Research on the relationship between anti-Zionism and antisemitism considers a similar possibility: strong opposition to the Jewish state can be a socially acceptable way to express anti-Jewish atti-

tudes (Smith and Schapiro 2019; Cohen et al. 2011).

In this study, we test hypotheses of antisemitic attitudes on the left that are detached from any specific political critiques of Israel. We hypothesize that when liberal identifiers are primed with information about Jewish Americans' affinity for Israel, they exhibit higher antisemitic attitudes due to their own comparably negative view of Israel. We hypothesize that Jewish support of Israel leads left-wing Americans to perceive Jews as an out-group and to hold Jewish Americans to higher standards of moral responsibility compared to other similarly positioned demographic groups.

## **2.3 Minority Group Antisemitism**

We separately consider antisemitic attitudes of racial minorities, particularly Black and Latino Americans. Although these racial groups tend to vote for Democrats (and therefore with the political left), past research suggests a relationship between minority groups and antisemitism that is distinct from the relationship between the political left and antisemitism. Prior empirical studies have long found high rates of antisemitic attitudes in Black and Latino identifiers (Cohen 2018; King and Weiner 2007).

One commonly discussed historical explanation for minority group antisemitism stems from splintering views on the Israel/Palestine conflict, particularly between Black Americans and Jewish Americans. The increased salience of the Israel/Palestine conflict in the late 1960s is frequently mentioned as a spark for both the dissolution of the decade-long civil rights alliance between the two groups and an increase in minority group antisemitism (King and Weiner 2007; Forman 1998; Rubin 1997). Current minority-group antisemitism could stem from Black and Latino Americans broadly continuing to embrace a heightened sense of solidarity with Palestine, resulting in an out-group dislike of Jewish Americans.

But upon further inspection, identifying with the Palestinian cause does not seem like the primary source of minority-group antisemitism. Rubin (1997) examines Black support

for Israel from the 1960s to the 1990s and finds that, while Black Americans did have greater sympathies for the Palestinians than white Americans did, they still tended to remain overall more sympathetic to Israel. When Black American support for Israel dipped (such as during the first intifada), white and Democratic support of Israel decreased to similar levels. Black Americans were also substantially more likely than white Americans to express no opinion on questions related to Israel or Palestine. These findings run counter to what we should expect if minority group antisemitism stemmed from an identification with the Palestinian cause. Additionally, in recent years, Black and Latino Democrats have become far more sympathetic with Israel than the Palestinians compared to white liberals or Democrats.<sup>27</sup> This again does not fit with identification with the Palestinians over Israel being the primary cause of minority group antisemitism.

A more promising explanation is that minority group antisemitism may result as a form of scapegoating when one feels threatened or unsafe (Cohen et al. 2011). As Bobo and Hutchings (1996) have written, “African Americans, closely followed by Latinos, are most likely to see other groups as competitive threats...These patterns reflect the historical and contemporary forms of racial subordination these groups have faced.” Black and Latino identifiers may thus see the relative success of Jewish Americans as coming at the expense of their own group’s success. This blame may manifest as antisemitism, particularly in areas with noticeably large Jewish populations. See also Enos (2017).

Separately, competition over victimhood status may be driving minority group antisemitism. Antoniou, Dinas and Kosmidis (2020) focus on anti-Jewish attitudes that stem from feelings of collective victimhood, given the Holocaust’s place as the “premium historical analogy or the reference point to any episode of collective suffering.” They theorize that increased attention to collective suffering of various groups can lead to a “spiral of victimhood,” where groups feel they are competing both for victimhood status and the benefits

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<sup>27</sup>Zach Goldberg, “Americas White Saviors,” *Tablet*, June 5, 2019.

they have been denied as a result of their victimization. They find that groups who feel their victimhood status is under-recognized may be more likely to develop out-group prejudice and hostility towards these other groups they deem competitors for victimhood (see also Perez and Salter (2020)).

Reflecting both on this research on racial group threat and on past studies of U.S. antisemitism, we expect to see higher rates of antisemitic attitudes among Black Americans and Latino Americans compared to whites, and we expect this to be a distinct phenomenon from a relationship between ideology and antisemitism.

### **3 DATA AND METHODS**

We fielded an original YouGov survey in November 2020 (Nov 9-25). We asked YouGov to create two samples, a sample of 2,500 respondents ages 18-30 and a sample of 1,000 respondents ages 18 and over. Both the young adult sample and the full adult sample were designed to be representative of the national population on gender, age, race, education, and 2016 vote choice. In several points in the analysis, we compare the under-30 sample with the 759 respondents who are over 30 in the general sample. The Supplementary Information (SI) includes documentation from YouGov about the construction of weights, which are used throughout this analysis.

The study was determined exempt from IRB review by the Tufts University Institutional Review Board for Social, Behavioral, and Educational Research, IRB ID: 00000710. Before seeing any survey questions, respondents read and agreed to an informed consent statement. They were informed that these questions were for a research study, that they would be compensated according to their agreement with YouGov, that participation is voluntary, and several other standard pieces of information. The SI shows the informed consent statement. In the statement, respondents were told: “In order to not influence your responses, you won’t

be informed about some aspects of the nature or purposes of the research until the end. At the end of the questionnaire, you will be debriefed.” In a debriefing statement at the end of the survey, respondents were informed that “the purpose of this study was to measure antisemitic attitudes among US adults.” In the debrief, respondents were reminded of how to contact the principal investigator and IRB office should they have any questions.

Because our interest is largely focused on the far left and far right, we utilize a 7-point measure of ideology (instead of a 3-point or 5-point measure), so that we can examine nuances on the ends of the ideological spectrum. Because we expect a non-linear relationship between ideology and measures of antisemitism, in all regressions estimating that relationship we utilize dichotomous variables for each point on the ideology scale, with the middle category (moderate) serving as the excluded category.

As an alternative measure of ideology, we asked respondents if they identify with any of the following labels: leftist, socialist, progressive, libertarian, Christian conservative, and alt-right. This list includes three identities associated with the left and three associated with the right. Respondents could check more than one.

Table 1 summarizes mean responses with respect to ideology and the six ideological identities, as well as racial identities and other variables. The under-30 respondents are twice as likely to identify on the farthest-left point on the ideology scale compared to older respondents. They are also considerably less likely to identify in the most conservative category. Similarly, the young sample is far more likely to identify as leftist and/or socialist, but less likely to identify as Christian conservative. Nevertheless, young adults and older adults are found across the range of ideological space: 29% of respondents under 30 identify on the conservative side of the spectrum and 30% of them identify as either Christian conservative or alt-right or both; similarly, 30% of respondents over 30 identify on the left of the ideological spectrum and 15% of them identify as leftist, socialist, or both.

In multivariate regression analysis in the young sample, we include indicators of whether

Table 1: Summary Statistics

	Adults 18-30	Adults 31+		Adults 18-30	Adults 31+
<i>7-pt. Ideology</i>			<i>Ideo. Identities</i>		
Very Liberal	0.19	0.09	Leftist	0.21	0.10
Liberal	0.15	0.11	Socialist	0.21	0.10
Moderate Liberal	0.12	0.10	Progressive	0.40	0.36
Moderate	0.25	0.26	Libertarian	0.18	0.15
Moderate Conserv.	0.10	0.14	Christian Conserv.	0.24	0.39
Conservative	0.09	0.15	Alt-Right	0.07	0.06
Very Conservative	0.10	0.16			
			<i>Other Ind. Vars</i>		
<i>Racial Groups</i>			State Pct. Jewish	2	2
White	0.54	0.69	Female	0.49	0.53
Black	0.14	0.11	Age	24	57
Latino	0.22	0.13	4-year Student	0.28	N/A
Other Race	0.10	0.08	Other Student	0.13	N/A

Note: Cells contain means. N=2,500 for young adults sample and N=759 for the adults over 30 in the general population sample.

the respondent is a.) currently enrolled in a 4-year college or university, or b.) currently enrolled in another kind of college or university, which includes two-year schools as well as non-traditional programs.

Following research on the geography of antisemitic encounters, we also include a measure of the percentage of the population that is Jewish in the respondent’s state of residence (Cohen 2010). Other variables include racial groups, measured as dichotomous variables for Black, Latino, and other non-white, with white identifiers representing the omitted category in regressions; age in years; and gender.

We ordered the questions in this survey from those that are least overt in asking respondents about attitudes toward Jews to most overt, though we report on the analysis here in a different order. In all regression analysis, we include control variables for the exact survey path respondents followed through various randomizations. This accounts for any average differences in responses based on respondents seeing different conditions from one another. The ordering of the questions is described in the SI.

## 4 PART I: OVERT ANTISEMITISM

We asked respondents three agree/disagree questions about their views on Jewish people:<sup>28</sup>

1. **Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America.**
2. **It is appropriate for opponents of Israel’s policies and actions to boycott Jewish American owned businesses in their communities.**
3. **Jews in the United States have too much power.**

The first and third of these questions are taken from a battery developed by the Anti-Defamation League (ADL).<sup>29</sup> These two questions from the ADL battery were previously assessed in King and Weiner (2007) as well. The ADL most recently asked these questions to U.S. adults in 2019. In its telephone-based survey, the ADL reported 24% of Americans agree that Jews are more loyal to Israel and that 11% of adults agree that Jews have too much power. Our full-adult population shows very similar mean values, with 22% reporting Jews are more loyal to Israel and 12% reporting Jews have too much power.

Respondents were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the first condition, these questions were prefaced by this statement:

**We’re going to ask you some questions about Jewish Americans.**

In the second condition, the questions were prefaced by the same sentence, but then, on a separate webpage, respondents saw an additional sentence:

**Dr. Frank Newport, Editor-in-Chief of the Gallup Poll, concluded in 2019 that “95% of Jews [in the U.S.] have favorable views of Israel.”<sup>30</sup>**

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<sup>28</sup>Jewish identifiers were not asked these questions.

<sup>29</sup>“Antisemitic Attitudes in the U.S.: A Guide to ADL’s Latest Poll,” Anti-Defamation League, 2019.


<sup>30</sup>Frank Newport, “American Jews, Politics and Israel,” Gallup, August 27, 2019.



In the absence of the priming prompt, our expectation was a U-shaped relationship with respect to ideology. That is, we expected higher agreement on these statements on the far left and the far right than in the ideological middle. In our planning document (see SI), we noted that we expected this relationship for the “boycott” measure and the “power” measure but not the “loyalty” measure, as we did not expect loyalty to America to be a particularly salient value on the far left in the Trump era (see Levendusky (2020)). In light of prior studies, we also expected higher agreement among Black and Latino respondents than white respondents.

The priming experiment emphasizes that Jewish Americans are supportive of Israel, though notice the language makes no mention of support for Israeli policy or politics. For respondents who are opposed to Israel and/or its policies, we expected this prime to emphasize that Jews are an out-group with respect to their positive affect toward the state of Israel. As such, we expected higher agreement on the three questions on the left following the prime.


Figure 1: Overt Antisemitic Attitudes, Young vs. Old, No Prime



Note: Means with 95% confidence intervals are shown. A lowess fit line is overlaid on the mean values to convey the relationship across points on the ideological scale.

The data did not comport with our original expectations. Figure 1 shows the relationships between ideology and agreement with each of the three questions in the condition without the prime. For all three questions, for young and old, the ideological left is least likely to agree with the antisemitic statements. For all three questions, the relationship with ideology is far more extreme among young respondents than older respondents. The young right is distinctive in that it is much more likely than either the young left or the older right to agree with each of these statements.

Figure 2: Overt Antisemitic Attitudes, Young Adults, Prime vs. No Prime



Note: Means with 95% confidence intervals are shown. A loess fit line is overlaid on the mean values to convey the relationship across points on the ideological scale.

Does the prime change the basic structure of this relationship? As Figure 2 shows, it does not. Figure 2 displays data just for the under-30 sample, comparing the half of the sample that saw the prime with the half that did not see the prime. The prime does not increase the rate at which individuals on the far left agree with the antisemitic statements.

Table 2 shows a regression-based view of these data. The first three models are measured with the representative sample of respondents ages 18-30. The last three are measured with the general-public sample of respondents ages 31+. In neither bivariate analyses nor

Table 2: Overt Measures of Antisemitism and Ideological Position

VARIABLES	Young Adults (18-30)			Adults 31+		
	Loyal	Boycott	Power	Loyal	Boycott	Power
Very Lib.	-0.087** (0.024)	-0.024 (0.023)	-0.071** (0.020)	-0.17** (0.059)	-0.072 (0.044)	-0.088* (0.042)
Liberal	-0.056* (0.025)	-0.053* (0.024)	-0.054* (0.021)	-0.13* (0.056)	-0.097* (0.042)	0.0060 (0.040)
Mod. Lib.	-0.011 (0.027)	0.0035 (0.026)	-0.0038 (0.023)	-0.0087 (0.057)	-0.094* (0.043)	0.015 (0.041)
Mod. Con.	0.14** (0.028)	0.12** (0.027)	0.056* (0.024)	-0.036 (0.051)	-0.055 (0.038)	0.075* (0.036)
Conservative	0.074* (0.031)	0.10** (0.029)	0.044 (0.026)	-0.039 (0.050)	-0.10** (0.038)	0.020 (0.036)
Very Con.	0.17** (0.030)	0.26** (0.028)	0.22** (0.025)	-0.032 (0.049)	-0.026 (0.037)	0.036 (0.035)
Prime	0.030 (0.016)	-0.00014 (0.015)	0.010 (0.013)	0.090** (0.030)	0.0043 (0.023)	0.0023 (0.022)
State Pct. Jew	0.018** (0.0036)	0.0097** (0.0034)	0.014** (0.0030)	0.0041 (0.0073)	0.0067 (0.0055)	0.0093 (0.0053)
Black	0.084** (0.023)	0.14** (0.022)	0.070** (0.020)	0.12* (0.049)	0.034 (0.037)	0.16** (0.035)
Latino	0.072** (0.020)	0.074** (0.019)	0.097** (0.017)	-0.045 (0.047)	-0.038 (0.035)	-0.0094 (0.034)
Other Race	0.017 (0.027)	-0.0034 (0.026)	0.030 (0.023)	-0.071 (0.059)	-0.093* (0.044)	0.028 (0.042)
Age	0.0047* (0.0022)	0.0081** (0.0021)	0.012** (0.0018)	0.00064 (0.0011)	-0.0014 (0.00086)	-0.0025** (0.00083)
Female	-0.045** (0.016)	-0.070** (0.015)	-0.060** (0.013)	-0.093** (0.030)	-0.087** (0.023)	-0.078** (0.022)
4-year College	0.024 (0.019)	0.088** (0.018)	0.062** (0.016)			
Other College	0.066** (0.024)	0.036 (0.023)	0.046* (0.020)			
Constant	-0.062 (0.062)	-0.13* (0.058)	-0.25** (0.051)	0.23** (0.086)	0.27** (0.064)	0.19** (0.062)
Observations	2,401	2,401	2,402	745	745	745
R-squared	0.082	0.109	0.119	0.072	0.063	0.086

Note: OLS regression. SEs in parentheses; \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Controls for sequence of conditions not displayed.

multivariate models does the prime vary systematically with ideology, so for the sake of parsimony in Table 2, we include the prime as an independent variable but not interacted with ideology.

As in the figures, the relationship between ideology and antisemitic attitudes is much stronger among young people than older people. For younger respondents, the relationship increases sharply as one moves ideologically from left to right. We also note that in two of the three measures (*boycott* and *power*), young adults have higher average agreement ( $p < .05$ ) than older adults, indicating more outgroup prejudice among young than old.


Consistent with prior research, antisemitic attitudes are much more common among Black respondents than white respondents. We see this relationship among young respondents as well as old respondents. Among young adults – but not older ones – Latino respondents have much higher support for these statements than white respondents.

Compared to young adults who are not currently in college, college students have higher agreement with the antisemitic statements than non-college students. As with other studies of antisemitic attitudes in the U.S., men are much more likely to agree with these statements than women. Finally, for young respondents but not older respondents, individuals in states with large Jewish populations exhibit higher rates of antisemitic attitudes.

An alternative version to Table 2 can be found in Appendix Table SI1. There, rather than measuring ideology with a seven-point scale, we measure it through identities such as socialist, leftist, Christian conservative, and alt-right. Compared to individuals who identify with none of the six options (and who when asked overwhelmingly identify themselves as moderates), progressives agree the least and the alt-right agrees the most with antisemitic statements.

Overt antisemitic attitudes are higher on the right than the left. But there is a puzzle: Black and Latino respondents, in addition to college students, also show high rates of antisemitic attitudes, yet these groups are more commonly associated with the ideological left

Figure 3: Overt Antisemitic Attitudes (Ages 18-30), by Racial Group



Note: Means with 95% confidence intervals are shown. A lowess fit line is overlaid on the mean values to convey the relationship across points on the ideological scale.

than the right. How can these groups showcase high levels of support for the antisemitic statements while the ideological left exhibits low levels of support?

In part, the puzzle is resolved through recognizing the ideological diversity of racial minorities as well as college students. Among young people, 30% of white, Black, and Latino respondents, and 25% of college students, identify as conservative. Racial groups across the ideological spectrum and students on the *right* are distinctly supportive of antisemitic statements.

In Figure 3, we show two variables that summarize the overt measure of antisemitism. Figure 3(A) shows the percentage of individuals, by race and ideology, who agree with one or more of the agree/disagree statements (combining the prime/no prime conditions). Figure 3(B) shows the average number of statements (out of 3) that respondents, by race and ideology, agree with. Black and Latino respondents have higher agreement with these

statements than white respondents on the left and the right of the ideological spectrum. The white/Latino difference is especially prominent on the ideological right.<sup>31</sup> The white/Black difference is roughly equal across the ideological space. Figure 3 confirms that which is reflected in the multivariate regression: the racial effect here is present independent of the ideological effect.

In Appendix Figure S11 we show a version of this graph but for college students versus non-college students, among young adults ages 18-25 (the cohort in which most college students are found). It is college students on the far right who most agree with antisemitic statements.

#### 4.1 The Alleged Domains of Jewish Power

For respondents who agreed with the statement that Jews have too much power, we asked a follow-up question: *In what domains do you think Jews have too much power? Select all that apply.* Respondents could then click one or more of: (1) The Israel/Palestine conflict, (2) News media, (3) Entertainment, (4) US domestic politics, (5) Finance, and (6) Agricultural Production.

One possible explanation for agreeing with statements such as that “Jews in the United States have too much power” is that the statements simply reflect on a policy view related to the state of Israel. When respondents agree with a statement like this, perhaps what they really mean is “Jews in the United States have too much power *regarding the Israel/Palestine conflict.*” For instance, under the theory discussed above that Black/Latino antisemitism is rooted in the Israel/Palestine conflict, one might hypothesize that minority respondents will focus claims of Jewish power specifically on this policy dispute.

However, reflecting on the literature, we hypothesized that across ideological and demo-

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<sup>31</sup>Note that there are 414 Latino identifiers in 18-30 sample, including 50 who identify as moderately conservative, 36 who identify as conservative, and 33 who identify as most conservative.

graphic cohorts the notion of Jewish power extends beyond the confines of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Specifically, we anticipated belief that Jews have too much power over news media and finance, two domains that have long been central to antisemitic conspiracy theories (Lipstadt 2019). In our list of domains, we also included “agricultural production” – an area in which, as far as we know, there is neither evidence of Jewish over-representation nor widespread antisemitic conspiracies of Jewish power.

Figure 4 shows the results for different cohorts within the sample. In no cohort do even 10% of those who believe Jews have too much power have in mind just the Israel/Palestine conflict (as reflected in the red bar). More respondents agree that Jews have too much power in agricultural production than who clicked only the Israel/Palestine option. In no cohort is the Israel/Palestine conflict even the most common domain cited. For young respondents, the most typical response is the news media. For older respondents, it’s finance. These results suggest that support for these statements is not closely connected to the Israel/Palestine conflict.

## 4.2 Do Jewish Americans believe these statements are antisemitic?


We anticipated the question of whether the measures of Jewish *power*, *loyalty*, and *boycott* are appropriately defined as antisemitic. One way to evaluate whether the statements are antisemitic is to ask Jewish identifiers what they think. Jewish identifiers saw this prompt: “*We’d like to ask for your perceptions of statements about Jews. Do you consider the following statements to be antisemitic?*” Respondents rated each statement as antisemitic or not antisemitic, or they could say they were not sure.

In total, 93 Jewish respondents took our survey. Of those who had an opinion, 86% believed the *loyalty* statement is antisemitic, 92% believed the *boycott* statement is antisemitic, and 91% believed the *power* statement was antisemitic.<sup>32</sup> Among just the Jewish identifiers

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<sup>32</sup>An additional 10%, 5%, and 6% of respondents were not sure if the *loyalty*, *boycott*, and *power* questions

Figure 4: In what domain do Jews have too much power?



Note: This question was asked to those who agreed that Jews have too much power. Under 30, N= 273; Over 30, N= 79; young White, N=121; young Black/Latino N=110; young liberals, N=74; young conservatives, N=129.

were or were not antisemitic, respectively.



in the 18-30 year old sample, 78% believed the *loyalty* statement is antisemitic, 93% believed the *boycott* statement is antisemitic, and 85% believe the *power* statement is antisemitic.<sup>33</sup> Young or old, Jewish Americans overwhelmingly believe these statements to be antisemitic.

## 5 PART II: LITMUS TESTS, DOUBLE STANDARDS

Through two more survey experiments, we explore a different manifestation of antisemitism. The theoretical premise is that, to some, Jews are deemed as both powerful and as an outgroup. Jews are associated with, seen as able to control, and therefore morally responsible for a foreign government (Israel). Here, we examine whether U.S. Jews, in contrast to other groups, are expected to abide by unique litmus tests regarding that foreign government.

Writers and scholars of antisemitism offer numerous anecdotes of antisemitism in this form. For instance, in her 2019 book, historian Deborah Lipstadt points to an anecdote involving the Jewish-American musician, Matisyahu. A film festival in Spain required Matisyahu to make a public statement supporting Palestinian statehood in order to perform. Other artists were not expected to make statements in order to perform.<sup>34</sup> In another example, organizers of the U.S. Women’s March proclaimed that one could not hold a view supportive of a Jewish state while also participating in their women’s movement, on the view that Zionism is a form of racism. The requirement to disavow an alleged oppressive movement seemed only to be a requirement for Jews.<sup>35</sup> Are anecdotes like these symptomatic of a wider phenomenon, or are they isolated events?

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<sup>33</sup>N=55, 60, and 62 Jewish identifiers (which excludes answering ‘not sure’ for these statements respectively).

<sup>34</sup>Daniel Kreps, “Spanish Reggae Festival Invites Matisyahu Back After Gov’t Condemnation,” *Rolling Stone*, Aug 19, 2015.

<sup>35</sup>John-Paul Pagano, “The Women’s March has a Farrakhan Problem,” *Atlantic*, March 8, 2018.

## 5.1 Jews, Muslims, and Litmus Tests for Activism

Respondents were randomly placed into one of two conditions.

In order to participate in social justice activism, [**Muslim Americans/Jewish Americans**] should unequivocally denounce [**Muslim countries’/Israel’s**] discrimination against [**non-Muslims/non-Jews**]?

We expected to find that respondents on the political left would be more likely to agree that Jews should denounce Israel than Muslims should denounce Muslim countries. We expected to find that respondents on the political right would exhibit the opposite pattern.<sup>36</sup>

What are the plausible reasons for why the left and right would have different expectations for Jews versus Muslims? It could simply be out-group dislike: anti-Muslim attitudes on the right and anti-Jewish attitudes on the left. Alternatively, it could be *in-group* affinity. That is, the left (right) may believe that Muslims (Jews) should not be forced to take positions because those groups are especially deserving of one’s sympathies. Another explanation is that American Jews and American Muslims are perceived by the left and the right, respectively, as having outsized moral responsibility for or political power over foreign sovereigns. Any of these explanations is consistent with out-group prejudice, with ideological differences causing the left and the right to see different groups as out-groups.

Bivariate results are in Figure 5. Regression results are in Table 3. On the left side of Figure 5, we show the pattern for young adults. Only about 20% of respondents who are ideologically moderate believe that Jews should denounce Israel. That number is 20 percentage points higher on the far left as well as on the far right. Belief that U.S. Muslims should denounce Muslim countries is lowest on the far left and highest on the far right. The right exhibits an anti-Muslim litmus test; the left, particularly the 20% that identify as most


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<sup>36</sup>Jewish and Muslim identifiers are excluded from this analysis.

left, exhibits an anti-Jewish litmus test, where Jews more than Muslims are expected to denounce foreign countries.

Respondents over age 30 reveal the same basic pattern with respect to Muslims, but a very different pattern with respect to Jews. Older liberals, like young liberals, reveal an anti-Jewish double standard. But the older right has very low levels of expectations that Jews denounce Israel. Whereas the pattern for young people is U-shaped, the pattern for older people is not. Young conservatives are distinct from older conservatives in their belief that Jews should denounce Israel. As with the study of overt measures of antisemitism, this measure shows a striking difference in how older and younger conservatives perceive Jews.

Figure 5: Denouncing Israel or Muslim Countries as a Litmus Test for Social Justice Activism?



Note: Means with 95% confidence intervals are shown. A loess fit line is overlaid on the mean values to convey the relationship across points on the ideological scale.

In Table 3, the multivariate analysis reveals the same pattern with respect to ideology. The patterns with respect to race and to students are different here than in the study of overt antisemitism. Here, young Black Americans are more likely than whites to support the

Table 3: Double Standards: Expectations of Jewish Americans versus Muslim Americans

	Young Adults (18-30)		Adults 31+	
	Muslims Denounce	Jews Denounce	Muslims Denounce	Jews Denounce
Very Lib.	0.015 (0.042)	0.24** (0.042)	-0.13 (0.091)	0.18 (0.098)
Liberal	0.066 (0.044)	0.17** (0.044)	0.028 (0.097)	0.21* (0.083)
Mod. Lib.	0.064 (0.049)	0.094* (0.047)	-0.14 (0.091)	0.31** (0.091)
Mod. Con.	0.10* (0.050)	0.13** (0.049)	0.00013 (0.085)	-0.056 (0.077)
Conservative	0.23** (0.057)	0.10 (0.053)	0.16* (0.082)	-0.13 (0.079)
Very Con.	0.29** (0.049)	0.20** (0.056)	0.24** (0.079)	-0.068 (0.077)
Pct. Jewish	-0.0035 (0.0063)	0.0032 (0.0064)	0.014 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.011)
Black	0.092* (0.040)	0.12** (0.042)	-0.12 (0.079)	0.059 (0.079)
Latino	0.040 (0.035)	0.057 (0.035)	-0.039 (0.077)	-0.023 (0.075)
Other Race	0.027 (0.047)	0.11* (0.051)	-0.029 (0.095)	0.14 (0.096)
Age	0.020** (0.0038)	0.0061 (0.0037)	0.0025 (0.0019)	0.0025 (0.0018)
Female	-0.13** (0.027)	-0.059* (0.028)	-0.21** (0.050)	0.0055 (0.048)
4-year College	0.089** (0.032)	0.067* (0.034)		
Other College	0.033 (0.043)	0.053 (0.042)		
Constant	-0.21 (0.11)	0.061 (0.11)	0.41** (0.13)	0.075 (0.13)
Observations	1,199	1,148	379	363
R-squared	0.098	0.054	0.136	0.128

Note: OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses; \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Variables controlling for each respondent's sequence of experimental conditions are estimated but not displayed.

litmus test for both Muslims and Jews; there are no distinctly anti-Jewish attitudes. The same is apparent for young Latino identifiers though the coefficients are half the magnitude as for Black Americans and are not significant at the 0.05 level. Similarly, four-year college students are more likely than non-students to agree with the Muslim and Jewish litmus tests, but they do not exhibit a double-standard.

The evidence suggests an anti-Jewish litmus test among the left and an anti-Muslim litmus test on the right. Of course, individuals on both the left and right may object to the claim that the differences revealed through this experiment amount to outgroup bias. They might believe that it is rational to hold American Jews or American Muslims more responsible for the foreign countries. Nevertheless, the results are consistent with the anecdotal evidence of anti-Jewish double-standards on the left and anti-Muslim double-standards on the right.<sup>37</sup>

## 5.2 Jews, Indians, Catholics and International Accountability

Another experiment on double standards divides the sample into three groups. Each group received two agree/disagree questions focused either on Jewish Americans, Indian Americans, or Catholic Americans:

**[Jewish / Indian / Catholic]** Americans should do more to make **[Israel / India / the Vatican]** a more responsible country in the world.

**[Jewish / Indian / Catholic]** Americans should be held accountable for **[Israel's / India's / the Vatican's]** actions.

The order in which respondents saw the two questions was randomized. The first question's wording suggests that U.S. subgroups should take positions regarding foreign sovereigns.

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<sup>37</sup>For a discussion of anti-Muslim double standards, see, for example: William Saletan, "Radical Right-Wing Terrorism," *Slate*, October 31, 2018.

The second question’s wording suggests that U.S. subgroups are culpable for the actions of foreign sovereigns.<sup>38</sup>

There is no perfect analogous relationship to the relationship between Jewish Americans and the state of Israel. Indians and Catholics both share some similarities to the relationship. India, like Israel, is a democracy, a U.S. ally, and has laws that discriminate against Muslims.<sup>39</sup> Indian-Americans share with Jewish Americans very high income and education levels. To the extent that Jewish Americans have the socio-economic resources to exert influence over U.S. policies, Indian Americans have similar resources.<sup>40</sup> The relationship is not perfectly parallel. Indian-Americans are immigrants or descendants of recent immigrants from India whereas most Jewish Americans do not have this relationship to Israel. Also, we do not know whether Indian Americans have an affinity for India to the same extent that Jewish Americans have an affinity for Israel. Nevertheless, we include this comparison because Indian Americans have socioeconomic resources and an ancestral connection to a democratic U.S. ally that has discriminatory policies against Muslims.

For another comparison, we include Catholics, for whom the Vatican provides a different kind of analogy to Israel. Though not exactly a homeland and not a place from which Catholics emigrate, the Vatican represents a religious-oriented sovereign. The U.S. has a history of accusing Catholics of dual loyalty to the Vatican.<sup>41</sup> The Catholic Church has also been the subject of a major scandal. Respondents, we hypothesized, might hold U.S.

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
<sup>38</sup>Jewish, Catholic, and Hindu identifiers are removed from the analysis when they are randomly placed into the condition related to Israel, the Vatican, and India, respectively. We do not have survey data to identify Indian-Americans specifically so instead utilize a religion measure for Hindus. Just over half of Indian-Americans identify as Hindu. For Indian-American demographics, see Drew DeSilver, “5 Facts About Indian Americans,” Pew Research Center, September 30, 2014.

<sup>39</sup>See, e.g. Arsalan Iftikhar, “India’s New Anti-Muslim Law Shows the Broad Allure of Right-Wing Islamophobic Policies,” NBC News, Jan 13, 2020; Isaac Chotiner, “The Real Objective of Mob Violence Against Muslims in India,” *New Yorker*, Feb 28, 2020.

<sup>40</sup>“Indian Americans,” Pew Research Center, Social and Demographic Trends, 2012; “A Portrait of Jewish Americans,” Pew Research Center, Religion and Public Life,” 2013.

<sup>41</sup>See, for instance, then-candidate John F. Kennedy’s September 12, 1960 speech: NPR, Transcript: JFK’s Speech on his Religion, December 5, 2007.

Figure 6: Holding U.S. Jews, Catholics, and Indians Responsible for Foreign Sovereigns, Respondents Age 18-30



Note: Means with 95% confidence intervals are shown. A lowess fit line is overlaid on the mean values to convey the relationship across points on the ideological scale.

Catholics responsible or culpable for the Vatican’s actions and inactions as they might hold U.S. Jews responsible for Israel’s actions and inactions.

Our initial expectation was that both the political left and the political right (relative to moderates) would hold Jews more responsible for Israel than they would hold Catholics or Indians responsible for the Vatican or India, under the theory that Jews are seen as especially responsible for Israel and as having outsized power. We expected a particularly large difference in the left’s treatment of Indians versus Jews. We reasoned that the left would consider Indian Americans as more of an in-group on account of Indian Americans being non-white.<sup>42</sup>

As demonstrated in Figure 6, our intuitions were only partially correct. The political right does not distinguish very much between holding Jews, Catholics, and Indians accountable

<sup>42</sup>Zach Goldberg, “Americas White Saviors,” *Tablet*, June 5, 2019.

for foreign countries. Much more than liberals, conservatives believe that these American groups should do more to make foreign countries responsible and they should be held to account for foreign countries' actions.

On the left, the patterns vary dramatically depending on whether the group in question is Catholics, Jews, or Indians. The left, particularly the 20% of young adults who identify as the farthest left point, are about twice as likely to think Jewish Americans should do more to make Israel responsible than to think Indian Americans should do more to make India responsible. They are about four times more likely to think Catholic Americans should do more to make the Vatican a responsible actor compared to Indian Americans and India. Note that when asked the more extreme form of the question (Figure 6(B)) — that these groups should not just do more but be held to account — almost no one on the far left believed Jews and Indians should be held responsible but some 20% believed Catholics should be held responsible.

Figure 6 shows this double standard on the left but also shows that double standard in context of the patterns on the ideological far-right. The rate at which respondents hold religious/ethnic groups responsible for foreign countries is far greater on the ideological right than the ideological left. The view that Jews are responsible for Israel is much more common overall on the right than the left. Moreover, while the left shows a double standard toward Jews (versus Indians) on the question of whether groups should do more to make a foreign country better, the right is much more supportive of the ominous claim that U.S. Jews should be held accountable for Israel's actions.

Table 4 shows the multivariate regression analysis. (Table SI2 shows the results for 31+ respondents). Black and Latino identifiers are more likely than White identifiers to believe that both Indians and Jews should do more to make foreign countries responsible. They are not distinct from White identifiers with regard to Catholics. In the *accountability* question, Black respondents are distinct from White respondents regarding holding Catholics and



Table 4: Holding U.S. Jews, Catholics, and Indians Responsible for Foreign Sovereigns, Adults Ages 18-30

VARIABLES	Should Do More			Held Accountable		
	Catholics	Indians	Jews	Catholics	Indians	Jews
Very Lib.	0.15** (0.054)	-0.11** (0.041)	0.100* (0.046)	0.087 (0.044)	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.015 (0.036)
Liberal	0.029 (0.055)	-0.051 (0.045)	0.050 (0.049)	-0.025 (0.045)	-0.019 (0.038)	-0.052 (0.038)
Mod. Lib.	0.076 (0.060)	-0.080 (0.048)	0.15** (0.053)	0.026 (0.049)	-0.034 (0.041)	0.015 (0.042)
Mod. Con.	-0.0050 (0.069)	-0.0088 (0.051)	0.17** (0.053)	0.017 (0.057)	0.047 (0.042)	0.10* (0.042)
Conservative	0.076 (0.075)	0.034 (0.060)	0.19** (0.060)	0.13* (0.061)	0.12* (0.051)	0.30** (0.047)
Very Con.	0.21** (0.073)	0.31** (0.055)	0.33** (0.053)	0.38** (0.060)	0.29** (0.047)	0.31** (0.041)
Pct. Jewish	0.012 (0.0080)	0.0045 (0.0066)	0.0099 (0.0069)	0.0064 (0.0065)	0.0032 (0.0056)	0.017** (0.0054)
Black	0.032 (0.056)	0.13** (0.040)	0.097* (0.047)	0.18** (0.046)	0.21** (0.033)	0.044 (0.037)
Latino	-0.048 (0.049)	0.10** (0.035)	0.080* (0.036)	0.091* (0.040)	0.12** (0.030)	0.15** (0.028)
Other Race	-0.0020 (0.060)	0.081 (0.056)	0.10* (0.047)	0.10* (0.049)	0.073 (0.047)	0.026 (0.037)
Age	0.019** (0.0051)	0.0089* (0.0039)	0.00067 (0.0040)	0.0033 (0.0042)	0.013** (0.0033)	0.010** (0.0031)
Female	-0.025 (0.036)	-0.12** (0.028)	-0.034 (0.030)	-0.030 (0.029)	-0.100** (0.024)	-0.0095 (0.023)
4-year College	0.065 (0.043)	0.026 (0.033)	0.037 (0.036)	-0.0065 (0.036)	0.043 (0.028)	0.13** (0.028)
Other College	0.090 (0.055)	0.053 (0.043)	-0.067 (0.047)	0.020 (0.045)	0.093* (0.036)	0.053 (0.037)
Constant	-0.29* (0.14)	0.032 (0.11)	0.057 (0.11)	-0.021 (0.11)	-0.20* (0.090)	-0.28** (0.086)
Observations	667	810	796	667	810	796
R-squared	0.063	0.122	0.076	0.111	0.169	0.206

Note: OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ . Variables controlling for each respondent's sequence of experimental conditions are estimated but not displayed. Catholic, Jewish, and Hindu identifiers are removed from conditions that ask about the Vatican, Israel, and India, respectively.

Indians accountable but not Jews. Latino respondents are distinct from White respondents on all three conditions. In addition, note that 4-year college students, controlling for ideology and all other variables in the model, are 13 percentage points more likely to believe that Jewish Americans should be held accountable for Israel's actions, whereas they are not distinct from non-college students with regard to Indian Americans or Catholic Americans.

## 6 DISCUSSION

We have explored several manifestations of antisemitic attitudes, including overt antisemitic claims as well as double standards in which U.S. Jews are held morally responsible for Israel or must pass moral litmus tests unlike other Americans. There are many other manifestations of antisemitism beyond what we have studied here, but they must be left to future research.

For overt measures, we find antisemitic attitudes are rare on the ideological left but common on the ideological right, particularly among young adults on the right. Even when primed with information that most U.S. Jews have favorable views toward Israel – a country disfavored by the ideological left – respondents on the left rarely support statements such as that Jews have too much power or should be boycotted.

In measures examining double standards, we find evidence on the left of anti-Jewish double standards compared to Muslim Americans and Indian Americans. The right exhibits strong anti-Muslim double standards. However, in these measures too, the anti-Jewish attitudes on the left are small in magnitude compared to the anti-Jewish attitudes on the right. The right does not have an anti-Jewish double standard, but they nevertheless attribute to Jews substantially more responsibility and culpability for Israel than the left does. Indeed, an outright majority (53%) of young far-right identifiers believe that Jewish Americans should be held to account for Israel – five times higher than the rate at which the young far-left

agrees with such a statement (9%).

While antisemitism in the U.S. is often written about through a “both sides” lens, our evidence — the first of its kind in testing hypotheses through experiments on a large representative sample — suggests the problem of antisemitism is much more serious on the right than the left. This evidence confirms that the antisemitism that has been on prominent display in white nationalist protests is not merely confined to a tiny group of extremists; antisemitic attitudes appear quite common among young conservatives, and much more so than among older conservatives or among liberals of any age.

We have also identified a high rate of agreement with overt antisemitic statements among Black and Latino identifiers, a phenomenon that is consistent with prior research. Young Black and Latino identifiers agree with overt antisemitic statements at similar rates that far-right white identifiers do. Black and Latino respondents are diverse in their ideological positioning, but across the ideological spectrum they harbor more antisemitic attitudes than whites. At the same time, unlike the far right and the left, minority respondents do not exhibit distinct attitudes in the double-standard measures.

Our study draws attention to group conflict in the U.S. that does not fall neatly along the left-right spectrum. We have shown evidence that Jews are treated as an outgroup by racial minorities, by the far left, and especially by the far right. We hope future research will continue to study group conflicts of this kind. Recent research suggests dangers in the alignment between social and political identities (Mason 2018). We highlight here a different type of danger: one that arises from a social identity engendering prejudice as an out-group from different sides of political and racial cleavages. Partisans perceiving half of the U.S. as being on a different team can be dangerous for democracy, but social groups facing prejudice from both sides of a political divide can lead to scapegoating and danger as well. Indeed, too often it has turned deadly.

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## 7 Supplementary Information




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## 7.1 Supplementary Tables and Figures

Figure SI1: Overt Antisemitic Attitudes, College Students versus non-students



Note: This figure restricts the sample to those ages 18-25, as the vast majority of students are in this group. It compares 4-year college students to non-college students in this age cohort.

Table SI1: Overt Measures of Antisemitism and Ideological Identity -  
Alternative Version of Table 2

VARIABLES	Young Adults (18-30)			Adults 31+		
	Loyal	Boycott	Power	Loyal	Boycott	Power
Socialist	0.017 (0.021)	0.0021 (0.020)	0.0058 (0.018)	0.073 (0.058)	0.025 (0.044)	0.073 (0.042)
Leftist	-0.074** (0.021)	-0.018 (0.020)	-0.027 (0.018)	-0.12* (0.056)	-0.030 (0.042)	-0.062 (0.040)
Progressive	-0.085** (0.019)	-0.073** (0.018)	-0.064** (0.016)	0.013 (0.045)	0.023 (0.034)	0.015 (0.033)
Libertarian	-0.012 (0.022)	-0.031 (0.021)	-0.0097 (0.019)	-0.11* (0.051)	0.015 (0.038)	-0.015 (0.036)
Alt Right	0.058 (0.032)	0.22** (0.031)	0.17** (0.027)	0.065 (0.071)	0.11* (0.054)	0.098 (0.051)
Christian Conserv.	0.092** (0.023)	0.037 (0.021)	0.043* (0.019)	0.012 (0.047)	-0.018 (0.036)	0.043 (0.034)
Prime	0.030 (0.016)	0.0033 (0.015)	0.013 (0.013)	0.085** (0.030)	0.0070 (0.023)	0.0024 (0.022)
State Pct. Jew	0.017** (0.0036)	0.0082* (0.0034)	0.012** (0.0031)	0.0059 (0.0074)	0.0059 (0.0055)	0.0089 (0.0053)
Black	0.069** (0.024)	0.14** (0.022)	0.068** (0.020)	0.14** (0.050)	0.043 (0.038)	0.17** (0.036)
Latino	0.068** (0.020)	0.060** (0.019)	0.088** (0.017)	-0.019 (0.046)	-0.033 (0.035)	-0.0043 (0.033)
Other Race	0.021 (0.027)	-0.016 (0.026)	0.023 (0.023)	-0.051 (0.059)	-0.100* (0.044)	0.034 (0.042)
Age	0.0055* (0.0022)	0.0087** (0.0021)	0.013** (0.0018)	0.00087 (0.0011)	-0.0014 (0.00086)	-0.0021** (0.00082)
Female	-0.057** (0.016)	-0.085** (0.015)	-0.072** (0.013)	-0.10** (0.030)	-0.081** (0.023)	-0.085** (0.022)
4-year College	0.036 (0.019)	0.094** (0.018)	0.068** (0.016)			
Other College	0.066** (0.024)	0.039 (0.023)	0.046* (0.021)			
Constant	-0.036 (0.062)	-0.077 (0.059)	-0.23** (0.052)	0.18* (0.089)	0.22** (0.067)	0.17** (0.064)
Observations	2,402	2,402	2,403	746	746	746
R-squared	0.078	0.093	0.100	0.074	0.058	0.083

Note: OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses; \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Variables controlling for each respondent's sequence of experimental conditions are estimated but not displayed.

Table SI2: Holding U.S. Jews, Catholics, and Indians Responsible for Foreign Sovereigns, Adults 31+

VARIABLES	Should Do More			Held Accountable		
	Catholics	Indians	Jews	Catholics	Indians	Jews
Very Lib.	0.28*	-0.31**	0.084	0.16	-0.10	-0.081
	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.098)	(0.070)	(0.062)
Liberal	0.16	-0.12	0.35**	0.100	-0.14*	-0.063
	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.094)	(0.096)	(0.067)	(0.054)
Mod. Lib.	-0.0097	-0.12	0.14	0.043	-0.075	0.0020
	(0.15)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.11)	(0.066)	(0.059)
Mod. Con.	0.043	-0.090	-0.024	0.063	0.017	0.016
	(0.13)	(0.092)	(0.088)	(0.096)	(0.060)	(0.051)
Conservative	-0.13	-0.15	0.031	0.050	-0.035	0.094
	(0.13)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.098)	(0.059)	(0.051)
Very Con.	0.27	0.067	0.16*	0.14	0.052	0.047
	(0.14)	(0.094)	(0.082)	(0.10)	(0.061)	(0.047)
Pct. Jewish	0.0098	-0.0098	-0.0016	0.0053	-0.0068	0.0100
	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.0093)	(0.0075)
Black	0.020	0.045	0.17*	0.18	0.14*	0.13**
	(0.15)	(0.088)	(0.082)	(0.11)	(0.057)	(0.047)
Latino	0.095	-0.10	0.24**	0.16*	-0.010	-0.050
	(0.10)	(0.091)	(0.078)	(0.078)	(0.059)	(0.045)
Other Race	-0.0056	-0.12	0.041	-0.15	-0.054	-0.0023
	(0.17)	(0.11)	(0.093)	(0.13)	(0.069)	(0.054)
Age	-0.0031	-0.00095	0.0017	-0.0050*	-0.0033*	-0.0054**
	(0.0029)	(0.0021)	(0.0020)	(0.0021)	(0.0014)	(0.0012)
Female	-0.16*	-0.13*	-0.12*	-0.12*	-0.067	-0.064*
	(0.079)	(0.058)	(0.053)	(0.059)	(0.038)	(0.031)
Constant	0.56**	0.56**	0.14	0.41**	0.35**	0.37**
	(0.19)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.14)	(0.10)	(0.078)
Observations	170	260	244	170	260	244
R-squared	0.118	0.095	0.145	0.149	0.103	0.165

Note: OLS regression. Standard errors in parentheses; \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05. Variables controlling for each respondent's sequence of experimental conditions are estimated but not displayed. Catholic, Jewish, and Hindu identifiers are removed from conditions that ask about the Vatican, Israel, and India, respectively.

## 7.2 Survey Details

### 7.2.1 Informed Consent Text

The next questions are part of academic research on political attitudes, conducted by Eitan Hersh of Tufts University. Respondents may derive an intellectual benefit from thinking about their political ideas, but the researcher offers no tangible benefits to the respondents for participating. You will be compensated according to your agreement with YouGov. Participation is completely voluntary. The questions are not sensitive, are not expected to cause offense or embarrassment, and no foreseeable risks are anticipated. In order to not influence your responses, you wont be informed about some aspects of the nature or purposes of the research until the end. At the end of the questionnaire, you will be debriefed. You are free to decline to participate, to end participation at any time for any reason, or to refuse to answer any individual question. Refusal to participate or discontinuing participation after consent will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to which the participant is otherwise entitled, such as incentives from the survey firm. Professor Hersh is collaborating on this research with Laura Royden, PhD student at Harvard University, who will also have access to the data and will conduct analyses. The researchers will never have access to any personal identifying information. Your answers to this survey, along with non-identifiable demographic information, will be shared with the researcher. The researcher may publish the data in an online database for social science research. If you have any questions about the research or research subjects rights, you may contact the principal investigator at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. You may also contact the Office of the Tufts University Institutional Review Board at [REDACTED].

I agree

I do not agree

### 7.2.2 Debrief Text

Thank you for participating in this academic research on political attitudes. The purpose of this study was to measure antisemitic attitudes among US adults. If you have any questions about the research or research subjects rights, you may contact the principal investigator at [REDACTED] or [REDACTED]. You may also contact the Office of the Tufts University Institutional Review Board at [REDACTED].

Do you consent to participation in this study?

Yes

No

### 7.2.3 Question Ordering

The YouGov survey included several questions that are being analyzed in a different research paper. Those questions relate to a.) favorability of various countries in the world, b.) rank ordering of importance of eleven policy issues, and c.) a question about how domestic policy debates should be resolved. Those questions all come before the questions under investigation here. Nevertheless, as described in the text, the regression analyses here control for the full sequence of randomizations in the YouGov survey.

Respondents first saw the *Muslim/Jewish* double-standard question. They then saw the *Catholic/Jewish/Indian* double-standard question. Finally, they saw *loyalty, boycott,* and *power* questions (randomized with/without the prime). Following the *power* question, respondents who agreed with the statement were asked the followup question about the domains of Jewish power.

### 7.2.4 Pre Analysis Plan

Prior to conducting this study, we wrote an analysis plan. We shared the analysis plan with more than fifteen scholars in order to get feedback on our questionnaire and hypotheses.

Figure SI2: Survey Firm Description

=====  
Project Code: [REDACTED]  
Project Name: Antisemitic Attitudes  
Prepared for: [REDACTED]  
Interviews: 3500  
Field Period: November 09, 2020 – November 25, 2020  
Project Manager: [REDACTED]  
=====

YouGov interviewed 3606 respondents who were then matched down to a sample of 1000 general population and 2500 oversample of young adults (18 to 30) to produce the final dataset. The respondents were matched to a sampling frame on gender, age, race, and education. The frame was constructed by stratified sampling from the full 2018 American Community Survey (ACS) 1-year sample with selection within strata by weighted sampling with replacements (using the person weights on the public use file).

The matched cases were weighted to the sampling frame using propensity scores. The matched cases and the frame were combined and a logistic regression was estimated for inclusion in the frame. The propensity score function included age, gender, race/ethnicity, years of education, and region. The propensity scores were grouped into deciles of the estimated propensity score in the frame and post-stratified according to these deciles.

The weights were then post-stratified on 2016 Presidential vote choice, and a four-way stratification of gender, age (4-categories), race (4-categories), and education (4-categories), to produce the 3 final weights. For the overall weight, the oversample of young adults were weighted down to the expected proportion within the US population.

=====  
The study here follows the analysis plan. We note wherever our initial hypotheses were not borne out by the data. For instance, as we note, we expected higher rates of overt antisemitic attitudes on the far left than in the ideological center, which is not what we found. The analysis plan included hypotheses about questions that are being analyzed in a different paper. Here we include the analysis plan for the questions studied in this paper:

***Overt Measures*** When prefaced by the prompt [with no prime], we expect support for

*all statements will be highest at the ideological extremes (i.e. among very liberal identifiers and very conservative identifiers). Support for [boycott] and [power] will be particularly high for respondents identifying with far-left groups like socialists and leftists. (We suspect these groups do not hold “loyalty to America” as a high value so won’t hold particularly strong views on **loyalty**.) Based on prior studies, we also expect support for statements to be high among Black and Latino respondents.*

*By way of the prompt [with the prime], we seek to emphasize that American Jews are overwhelmingly supportive of Israel (though not necessarily its political leadership). For respondents who are more sympathetic to Palestinians than Israel, this prompt may emphasize that Jews are an out-group with respect to that position. For respondents who are more sympathetic to Israel over Palestinians, this prompt may emphasize that Jews are an in-group with respect to that position.*

*Compared to when prompted [with no prime], respondents prompted [with the prime] will show greater support for the view that Jews are more loyal to Israel than to America. Among the ideological left, there will be more support for the view that Jews have too much power and more support for boycotting Jewish businesses. There will be less support for those positions among the ideological right.*

*If respondents have anti-Jewish sentiments only inasmuch as they have anti-Israel sentiments, then when they think about Jews holding too much power, they will think exclusively of Jewish influence over the Israel/Palestine conflict. However, if antisemitic attitudes run deeper than the Israel/Palestine conflict, then respondents will assert that Jews have too much power in other domains as well, such as in government, media, and finance. We hypothesize that those on the political extremes will be more likely to check responses beyond the Israel/Palestine conflict.*

**Validation check.** *Are these statements perceived as antisemitic by Jews? We ask Jewish respondents if the statements studied in [loyalty, boycott, power] are antisemitic. We*



*hypothesize that Jewish respondents will overwhelmingly label these statements antisemitic regardless of their ideological disposition.*

**Double Standards.** *Next, we study two experiments measuring the degree to which respondents hold US Jews to a different standard in terms of their responsibility for the policies of the state of Israel compared to other groups.*

*First, we compare responses to [Muslims] with responses to [Jewish]. We hypothesize that respondents on the far left will demand that Jews denounce Israel more than they demand Muslims to denounce Muslim countries. We expect the opposite among respondents on the ideological right. Next, we study the experiment in [Catholics, Jews, Indians]. Here, Jews/Israel are compared to two groups. Indian-Americans are chosen as a group for several reasons. Like Israel, India is a democracy. India is also subject of controversy for government discrimination against a Muslim minority. Indian-Americans are also similarly positioned in the United States as Jewish-Americans, insomuch they have unusually high levels of income and education, and thus they have the socio-economic resources to engage in political advocacy. Catholics/Vatican represent a second comparison group. Catholic Americans have a long history of being accused of dual loyalty. The Catholic Church has also been frequently criticized in recent years for malfeasance.*

*We hypothesize that those at the far extremes (very liberal, very conservative) will be more likely to hold Jews responsible for Israel's actions and believe that Jews should do more, in comparison to Catholics and Indian-Americans. We expect the biggest differences on the left to be between evaluations of the Jews/Israel case and the Indian-American/India case. On the left, Indian-Americans are likely to be considered more of an in-group than Jews or Catholics. As such, we expect the left to hold Indian-Americans less responsible for India than Jews for Israel. We also expect to see higher rates of support for the Jewish-focused statements among blacks and Latinos.*