drug problem with rehabilitative policies largely failed because these programs were severely underfunded. The combination of threats, failed rehabilitative programs, and worsening drug problem in Harlem led to growth in support for harsher penalties for drug dealers among middle- and working-class blacks.

Policies that would disproportionately punish African Americans created conflict for blacks in Harlem. Fortner demonstrates that many coped with this struggle by constructing a narrative that largely excluded drug users and dealers from being part of the black community by describing them as an “other” whose poor choices dampened opportunities for hardworking African Americans. Using this frame constructed by black Harlemites, Nelson Rockefeller was able to persuade some to support tougher drug penalties and enact antidrug legislation. *Black Silent Majority* concludes by discussing the conflict that blacks in Harlem faced by supporting harsher penalties that ultimately devastated the black community while at the same time yearning for a safer environment.

Fortner’s study makes several important contributions to the study of American politics. First, *Black Silent Majority* details how and why cleavages in the black community arise. While blacks tend to vote as a monolith, Fortner demonstrates that black public opinion is diverse; his analysis of drug policy in New York provides a road map of how these differences occur. Second, Fortner’s analysis provides insights into how local and national contexts, in conjunction with strategic politicians, interact to create new public policies. Finally, Fortner’s study provides one of the most complete analyses of how social problems spur political action and, ultimately, legislation that I have ever read.

One of the main strengths of this book is that Fortner uses a wide variety of data sources, including interviews, public opinion polls, newspaper data, and depictions of drug use in popular culture to demonstrate how blacks’ attitudes about drug policies and drug users shifted over time. The analysis in this book is so complete that I would use it as a model to teach about research methods. Moreover, the book is extremely engaging and very accessible to the average reader. The book would be a great addition to classes on racial and ethnic politics, public policy, and criminal justice.

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Eitan Hersh’s book proceeds from a simple but profound insight: electoral campaigns go to war with the data they have, not the data they might want or
the data we might imagine. Whereas many other studies of electoral behavior rely on secondary indicators to approximate what campaigns do, Hersh delves into the actual databases that (Democratic) campaigns rely on in their work. The result is a rich, detailed, and insightful account that challenges much of what we previously believed about how campaigns make use of voter data in elections. This is a benchmark text, one that I expect will have a long-standing impact on the direction of the field.

The core of Hersh’s work is what he calls the Perceived Voter Model. “Perceived voters compose the electorate from the campaign’s-eye-view. They are not people; they are avatars generated from whatever data a political campaign, candidate, or party can surmise . . . Campaigns do not perceive voters as voters perceive themselves” (pp. 7–8). The research literature is filled with studies that either assume campaigns to be rational actors with near-complete information or seek to understand campaigns through post hoc analysis of what voters recalled. Campaigns are not omniscient, though, and the promise of “big data” proves to be something of a mirage in practice.

One of Hersh’s most important findings is that public data (the voter file and census data) are far more reliable than commercial data or social network data. He demonstrates this by relying on state-by-state variance in public data. Some states require party registration, and some collect data on race/ethnicity, while others do not. By exploring this state-by-state variance, Hersh is able to show how differences in the quality of public data lead to dramatically different voter contact strategies. Where modeling based on commercial data is necessary to estimate party affiliation or racial characteristics, campaigns invest less in mobilizing their supporters.

Hersh also finds that for all the talk about commercial data and network data, campaigns cannot put much weight on these data sources (Chapter 8). Commercial data tend to be incomplete and unreliable. While the most well-resourced campaigns certainly purchase these data, they add little to their perception of the voters. At best, they can use these data in states that are public data deficient to try to model the same voter attributes they are tracking in states with rich public data policies.

Likewise, despite scholarly and journalistic excitement about the Internet transforming campaigns, Hersh finds that network-based strategies to reach undecided voters through their social networks (such as Facebook) have been severely limited. The network approach proves difficult because it requires core volunteers to start awkward conversations with their least political friends; it proves hard to reach the whole electorate when starting from the networks of hardcore volunteers; and committed campaign volunteers tend to have social networks that are heavily weighted toward other strong partisans. Again, this
does not mean that social networks are irrelevant, but it does limit their value compared with other data sources.

Public data are reliable and relatively complete. Consumer data are patchier and less reliable. Network data are rich but constrained by the contours of the supporter base. When trying to determine and model their voter universe, campaigns mostly have to rely on public data.

Since the 2012 election, there has been a heightened debate over whether sophisticated consumer databases are endangering American democracy. Sociologist Zeynep Tufekci wrote an op-ed for the New York Times warning that we should “Beware the Smart Campaign.” Her argument echoes similar warnings from scholars such as Philip N. Howard, who warned in his 2006 book New Media Campaigns and the Managed Citizen of the danger of “political redlining” that arises once campaigns can microtarget their voters narrowly enough to avoid unlikely voters and likely opponents entirely. Hersh’s Hacking the Electorate offers a powerful empirical correction to this line of thinking, emphasizing the limitations and uncertainty that campaigns experience when assessing these voters’ avatars and the critical importance of public data in guiding the choices made by campaigns. The book combines methodological sophistication with a clear focus on a timely and understudied question. I expect it will stand at the center of research debates for years to come.

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Michael Schudson went looking in the 1960s for the origin of an unheralded sociocultural change favoring openness and the “right to know” and came up short. He also did not find much evidence of full transparency as a fundamental democratic virtue lurking in the Founding Fathers’ rhetoric—a good second guess. Instead, Schudson discovered, against his sociological training, which favored structure over agency, a disparate group of individuals who brought Americans a broad array of political, economic, and cultural changes, including the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA); a more adversarial, analytical press; environmental impact statements (EIS); consumer-informing disclosures, such as unit pricing in supermarkets; “informed consent” research procedures; and open discussion about formerly private matters, such as women’s health and sexuality from Our Bodies, Ourselves to Betty Ford’s radical mastectomy. The book’s main argument is that these changes together